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Abstract: There is a kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of 
objective epistemic norms. It is generally regarded as harmless. There is another kind of 
objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of an objectivist account of 
justification, one that takes the justification of a belief to turn on its accuracy. It is 
generally regarded as hopeless. It is a strange and unfortunate sociological fact that these 
attitudes are so prevalent. Objectivism about norms and justification stand or fall 
together. Justification is simply a matter of conforming to norms.  In this essay, I shall 
make the case for objectivism about justification. 
 
1. Introduction 
I will defend two objectivist views. The first is a view about epistemic norms. The 
objectivist about epistemic norms believes that when we specify the application 
conditions for these norms we'll sometimes refer to objective conditions (i.e., conditions 
that don't supervene upon our non-factive mental states or the subjective aspects of our 
mental lives).  The second is a view about epistemic justification. The objectivist about 
epistemic justification believes that the justification of our beliefs depends upon certain 
objective conditions. The justification of our beliefs depends upon whether we violate 
any norms. Objectivism about norms and justification would seem to stand or fall 
together. 
 Norms identify the conditions under which someone should or should not 
believe, do, or feel something.  If you shouldn't believe lottery propositions or should 
increase your confidence when you acquire new evidence for your belief, there should 
be some norm that says as much.  The objectivist and subjectivist agree that some norms 
will have subjective application conditions. The fact that you are probabilistically 
coherent supervenes upon subjective conditions, so if there is a norm that requires 
coherence there is a norm that has a subjective application condition. Their 
disagreement is about whether there are any further norms, norms that require us to 
believe or refrain from believing when objective conditions obtain.  They would 
disagree about norms such as these:  
You shouldn't believe p unless you know p (Only 
Knowledge).1 
You shouldn't believe p unless p is true (Only Truth).2  
                                                        
1 For defenses of knowledge norms for assertion, belief, or reasoning, see Benton (2011), 
Bird (2007), Littlejohn (2013), Smithies (2013), Steglich-Petersen (2013), Sutton 
(2007), Turri (2011), and Williamson (2000). 
2 If Only Knowledge governs belief, so does Only Truth.  For defenses of Only Truth 
that aren't intended to support Only Knowledge, see Boghossian (2008), Nolfi (2015), 
You should believe p if you are in a position to know p and 
it matters whether you believe p (Any Significant 
Knowledge). 
While objectivists will disagree about which of these norms, if any, governs belief, 
subjectivists insist that all the real norms focus on relations between your beliefs and the 
subjective aspects of your mental life. The normative, they'll say, is concerned only with 
the subjective. 
 As I understand justification, an action or attitude is justified when it is proper, 
acceptable, permitted, right, or appropriate. If you have an attitude or perform an action 
and it's not the case that you shouldn't, the attitude or action counts as justified. Norms 
identify the conditions under which you should or should not have an attitude or 
perform an action, so we can characterize justification in terms of norm conformity and 
violation. On my simple view of things, objectivism about justification follows from 
objectivism about norms. While we'll see that some will object to this simple view, I 
would suggest that a belief is justified iff it violates no epistemic norms, which is to say 
that it is justified iff the thinker conforms to the epistemic norms. If we think of 
justification in this way, it would seem that objectivism about norms and justification 
should stand or fall together.3 
 For various reasons, most epistemologists reject the objectivist view of 
justification that I shall defend here.  I shall make a case for objectivism about 
justification and norms in the next section and then consider a subjectivist response in 
the section after that.  Convincing the reader that the view defended here is correct is a 
task that couldn't be done in the space of a single paper.  I shall offer the arguments for 
objectivism that I take to be interesting and important. Some of the controversial 
assumptions of these arguments have been defended at greater length elsewhere. Space 
also won't permit an extensive discussion of the arguments for subjectivism, so I've 
decided to focus on a recent defense of subjectivism because it might help us see why so 
many epistemologists are objectivists about norms and subjectivists about justification. 
It is the only defense of subjectivism about justification that hasn't yet been discussed in 
the extant literature. 
 
2.  Objective or Subjective? 
Let's start with a simple argument for objectivism about justification:  
An Argument for Objectivism 
O1. Your beliefs are justified iff you violate no epistemic 
norms in holding these beliefs. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Wedgwood (2002, 2013), and Whiting (2013).  For criticism, see Brown (2008), 
Gerken (2011) and McKinnon (2013). For a helpful overview of the extant debate, see 
McGlynn (2014).   
3 While Littlejohn (2012), Sutton (2007), and Williamson (forthcoming) all defend 
views on which beliefs are justified only when they don't violate objective norms, most 
of the writers mentioned above won't defend objectivism about justification by appeal to 
some objectivist view about norms. 
O2. You violate no epistemic norms in holding these 
beliefs iff these beliefs constitute knowledge. 4 
OC. Your beliefs are justified iff they constitute 
knowledge. 
If the argument is sound, readers should take the 'factive turn' and embrace an 
objectivist account of justification. Naturally, I don't expect readers to take this 
argument to be sound at this stage of the discussion, but I shall offer my supporting 
arguments momentarily. 
 If the objectivist view of justification defended here is correct, it should be 
possible for pairs of thinkers to process things in just the same way, draw the very same 
conclusions using the very same patterns of reasoning after things appear precisely the 
same to them, and still form beliefs that differ in justificatory status. This suggests that a 
kind of rational perfection might fall short of ensuring that some subject's beliefs are 
justified. If you like to talk about luck, you could say that the objectivist view of 
justification that identifies justified belief with knowledge allows for a certain kind of 
luck that many epistemologists won't allow for and doesn't allow for a certain kind of 
luck that many epistemologists would allow for.  I suspect that many epistemologists are 
opposed to the idea that a thinker might fail to acquire justified beliefs because they 
suffer the kind of bad luck that would prevent a rational thinker who reasons 
impeccably from acquiring knowledge.  One reason that I'm opposed to the subjectivist 
view is precisely because they want to try to show that this kind of luck isn't possible.  
                                                        
4 There is an interesting question about (O2) that we don't have space to discuss in 
detail. Is it possible to know p and violate some epistemic norm that requires you not to 
believe p? While it's an interesting question whether there could be cases in which 
someone shouldn't believe what they know, answering this question won't help us settle 
the debates between the objectivists and subjectivists.  There are some epistemologists 
who think that it's just obvious that anything you know you justifiably believe because 
they think that justification is a part of knowledge (whatever that means). This is not 
my picture of justification. On my account of justification, the justification property is a 
property that a belief has iff it violates no epistemic norm (or, more carefully, does not 
do so without sufficient reason). Because justification is not part of the nature of 
knowledge, it isn't trivially true that anything known is thereby justifiably believed and 
thereby believed without violating any epistemic norms. On my view, knowledge is a 
relation between a thinker and a fact, a relation that holds between some thinkers and 
some facts where the thinker's beliefs could not have the justification property because 
these thinkers cannot be held accountable for their attitudes or actions. Our beloved 
dogs and cats presumably know things about their environments, but I don't think we'd 
want to say that their beliefs could be justified or unjustified. I think that only thinkers 
that can be held accountable can have justified or unjustified beliefs. On my picture, the 
relationship between justification and knowledge is analogous to the utilitarian attitude 
towards the relationship between right action and optimific actions. A dog's actions 
might be optimific without being right, but the actions of responsible agents could not 
be anything but right if optimific.  
This knowledge account of justification implies controversially that a certain kind of 
luck that many epistemologists take to have no bearing on justification can rob you of 
justification. The lucky connection between a thinker and a fact that robs you of 
knowledge is one that robs you of justification on the present view.  In the course of our 
discussion, I shall explain why I think it's important for our view of norms and 
justification to register that the kind of accidental connections between thinker and fact 
that we're familiar with from the Gettier literature prevents you from acquiring beliefs 
that have good standing.  
 For their part, the subjectivist is quite likely to think that I've just made three 
significant errors. It's a mistake to think that truth is required for justification (and 
possibly a mistake to think that its required for conforming to epistemic norms), so 
naturally it is a mistake to think that a non-accidental connection to the truth is required 
for justification. It's a mistake to think that the kind of bad luck we suffer from when 
we're in hostile environments robs of justification by leading us into error precisely 
because these environments don't have any direct bearing on how our beliefs fit with 
appearances. This matters, they might think, because all epistemic assessment is 
concerned with the kind of processing that takes us from appearance to judgment or 
belief. Finally, they might also question the suggestion that rational perfection might fall 
short when it comes to satisfying a genuine normative requirement. The real norms, 
they might say, are only concerned with the relations between appearances and belief 
precisely because the norms are concerned only with how we reason, how we process 
what's given to us, and how we exercise our rational capacities. 
 Perhaps this ideology explains why many prominent subjectivists about 
justification would find Huemer's recent argument for subjectivism compelling:  
An Argument for Subjectivism 
S1. If p and q seem the same in all epistemically relevant 
respects to a perfectly rational person, she would accord 
the same credence to p and q.5  
                                                        
5 In the context of the paper, it is clear that Huemer intends the antecedent to be read as 
saying that p and q seem the same in all epistemically relevant respects to the particular 
thinker whose attitudes we're assessing.  He is not interested in whether p and q seem 
the same in such respects to an external observer who knows, say, that p is true and q is 
false. It should be noted that (S1) is not just a restatement of the idea that justification 
supervenes upon appearances. It is also not a trivial consequence of that supervenience 
thesis.  Someone could reject (S1) and still defend that supervenience thesis.  Suppose 
there's some rational requirement that says, in effect, that Agnes should suspend on p 
and not suspend on q when things appear a certain way to her. Things could appear the 
relevant way to Agnes, Agnes could be required to suspend on whether p but permitted 
to believe q, but it also might seem to Agnes that p and q are the same in all epistemically 
relevant respects. (Someone could say that this means that Agnes is somehow less than 
fully rational, but I don't see that. Provided that Agnes doesn't violate these rational 
requirements, I don't see her as rationally simply because she doesn't appreciate the 
rational difference between the propositions that she entertains but doesn't believe.) For 
S2. If a perfectly rational person would accord the same 
credence to p and q, then p and q have the same degree of 
justification.  
S3. The propositions p and q seem the same to our thinker 
in all epistemically relevant respects. 
SC. Therefore, p and q have the same degree of 
justification for our thinker.6 
We should read (SC) as implying that the thinker is in a position to justifiably believe p 
iff she is in a position to justifiably believe q.  Because it is possible for the thinker's 
beliefs in p and q to differ in truth-value when p and q seem to them the same in all 
relevant respects, this argument, if sound, would force the objectivist to reject (O2) and 
possibly (O1). 
 In choosing my arguments for (O1) and (O2), I chose arguments that would 
show why I think it's important for us to resist arguments like this argument for 
subjectivism.  It's clear that Huemer thinks that facts about how things seem or appear 
have a great deal of normative significance, but this argument doesn't tell us why we 
should think that. Some would ask us to consider error cases to try to elicit intuitions 
about rationality to shore up support for the key premises.7 Some would instead suggest 
that appearances play the role of evidence or ground and look to defend this argument 
by appeal to some norms that tell us that justification is entirely a matter of how our 
beliefs fit the evidence or grounds available.8  The arguments I've chosen should help 
readers see why I don't think that these ancillary considerations do much to support the 
subjectivist cause. 
 Does this argument need support from ancillary considerations? I think that it 
does. I have to confess that there was a time when I probably found this kind of 
argument quite troubling, but I don't now. The argument runs from some suggestions 
about rational credence to a conclusion about the justification of full belief. Since I'm 
interested in the justification of full belief, it's worth asking whether there's any good 
reason to think that the justificatory status of full belief in p and q would be the same if 
the subject rationally invested the same credence in these propositions. Lottery cases 
cause trouble for this proposal.  When it comes to beliefs in lottery propositions and 
beliefs based on what you read in the paper, it seems plausible that you should have 
higher credence when it comes to lottery propositions but it also seems that you cannot 
justifiably believe such propositions even though you can justifiably believe what you 
read in the paper.  Part of this is down to the fact that what you read in the paper isn't 
generally a known unknown (to use Sutton's terminology), something you know you 
couldn't know. Beliefs in lottery propositions are known unknowns. This explains, I'd 
                                                                                                                                                                     
criticism of (S1) and its use in Huemer's argument for phenomental conservatism, see 
Littlejohn (2011).       
6 Huemer (forthcoming).  
7 See Cohen (1984) and Wedgwood (2002). 
8 See Dougherty (2011) for a discussion of combining Conee and Feldman's (2004) 
evidentialist view with phenomenal conservatism.  
argue, why the respective beliefs can differ in justificatory status and why we should be 
skeptical of (S2). 
 Of course, it could be said that this is just a distraction because the objectivist 
and subjectivist can both agree that you shouldn't believe lottery propositions and can 
both agree that lottery propositions show that (S2) is mistaken. I agree. Once we strip 
away the questionable assumptions about the relationship between rational degrees of 
credence and the justification of full belief, it looks like we're left with nothing but the 
bare claim that if things appear the same with respect to two prospective beliefs, they 
have to agree in justificatory status. Why should we accept this? It's at just this point 
that the subjectivist will have to offer some fresh argument for thinking that the norms 
only care about relations between the subjective aspects of our mental life and our 
beliefs or some fresh argument to show that these appearances are the only possible 
rational basis we have to go on and use some implicit evidentialist assumption to try to 
justify (SC). My arguments for objectivism are supposed to speak to both issues. The 
first argument is an attempt to show that it's important to recognize that there are norms 
that are concerned with more than just relations between beliefs and appearances. The 
second is an attempt to show that it's a mistake to try to show that the appearances 
wholly determine what evidence we have and how we ought to be guided by it. 
 
2.1 The Transcendental Argument 
My first argument for objectivism about norms and justification is a transcendental 
argument.  The argument starts from an assumption about practical requirements. There 
are practical requirements to conform to objectivist norms. It then proceeds to show that 
these norms are binding only if there are objectivist norms that govern belief and made 
justification turn on whether we conform to Only Truth. This argument will not 
vindicate Only Knowledge, but it establishes an interesting form of objectivism and 
moves the discussion to a discussion about the best version of the objectivist view. 
 The starting assumption is that there are practical requirements to conform to 
objectivist norms, norms that have external application conditions: 
You shouldn't sentence the innocent for crimes they didn't 
commit (Only the Guilty). 
You should sentence those you know to be guilty (Any 
Known Offender). 
You should repair your past (objective) wrongs (Repair).9 
The fact that Agnes wasn't involved doesn't supervene upon the subjective aspects of 
your mental life. We can imagine a world in which you know that she was involved and 
you punish her in light of what you know. This might be permissible. We can hold the 
subjective states constant and then imagine another world where Agnes was framed. In 
this world you'd violate Only the Guilty if you punished.  You would run the risk of 
violating Repair if we didn't make appropriate reparations. 
 I don't have any complicated arguments for Only the Guilty or Repair. They 
both strike me as intuitively plausible.10 Consider the case in which you punish Agnes 
                                                        
9 An objective wrong is a wrong that involves violating an objectivist norm, such as 
Only the Guilty. 
for something that she did not do. You discover that she was innocent and that the 
evidence that led you to punish was misleading. Bad things happen all the time and you 
don't always have any special connection to them. It seems that this bad thing is 
something that you have a special obligation to do something about. You should assume 
responsibility for this harm and for trying to make this right even though it's not true 
that you should assume responsibility for similar harms, much less similar harms that 
you cause.11 This suggests that there's a reparative duty, a duty to right something that 
wasn't simply some harm you caused Agnes to suffer, but some harm that you 
wrongfully brought about. The duty arises because of a morally significant relation 
between you and Agnes that doesn't hold between Agnes and other parties not involved 
in the punishment who could take steps to make her better off.12 The fact that you 
weren't aware of the morally significant relationship you'd stand in by virtue of 
punishing her for something she didn't do doesn't erase the debt that you uniquely owe 
to her.13 
 I think it's important to resist the urge to rewrite these norms to fit the 
subjectivist framework. The subjectivist is right that we need to think about the 
subjective aspects of an agent's life when assessing the agent and her conduct. The 
subjective matters when we're interested in things like credit, blame, criticism, and the 
like, but this is only an aspect of morality and it isn't somehow more important than 
other aspects of morality. There is another part of morality that isn't directly concerned 
                                                                                                                                                                     
10 I should also add that if there were a group of people who acted as if these norms were 
binding, it would be hard to see what could be objectionable about it. We can imagine 
alternative practices, practices where people acted as if only subjective correlates of 
these norms would be binding and this wouldn't seem to be a terrible practice. It would, 
however, be a practice that, to my mind, left out some nice features of the objective 
practice (e.g., a set of duties that required compensation for acts that that objective view 
takes to be wrongful) and wouldn't appear to have many particularly important 
additional virtues that would offset the cost. In short, it would be nice if morality 
incorporated norms like Only the Guilty, Any Known Offender, and Repair and it 
wouldn't be nicer if morality dropped these in favor of subjective correlates. If true, 
might this be some evidence that morality involves objective elements? Perhaps. See 
Enoch (2009), Preston-Roedder (2014), and Sayre-McCord (MS) for discussion of 
whether it might.  
11 For an extended discussion on this point, see Littlejohn (2012). 
12 For further defense of this description of the case, see Littlejohn (2012). Zimmerman 
(2008) defends a kind of subjectivist view, one that insists that what we should do is 
always determined by a kind of expected value. He thinks (rightly, in my view) that 
subjectivists have to deny Repair and deny Only the Guilty. We shall discuss this 
further in §3. 
13 The intuition that suggests that it's possible for conscientious agents to violate moral 
norms owing to factual ignorance or mistake is reasonably widespread, even among 
those who defend subjectivist theories.  See Enoch (2012), Herman (1993), and 
MacFarlane (2016) for interesting attempts to vindicate the intuitions that seem to 
support objectivist norms.   
with such things and it's the part of morality that gives us guidelines that help to 
determine when someone has the right to proceed without interference, when someone 
should be protected against those who would harm them or their interests, and when 
some party need to take steps to apologize and make reparations. It's this part of 
morality that the objectivist gets right. Getting this right requires identifying standards 
that should guide action even when not seen perfectly by an agent. I fear that 
subjectivism, if left unchecked, leads us to draw mistaken conclusions about the kind of 
responsibility we should assume in the wake of violating some (putative) objectivist 
norm because it tries to deny the possibility that such guidelines have normative force 
when some agent has imperfect access to them.  
 The second assumption in the argument is unificationism, the view that says that 
there is a principled connection between the justificatory status of beliefs about what's 
required of us in the situations we're in and the justificatory status of the responses we 
believe to be required.  Unificationism says that if someone justifiably judges that they 
are required to Φ, she couldn't be required to do other than Φ.14 The segregationist denies 
this. The segregationist says that we can be required to do other than Φ in situations 
where we nevertheless justifiably judge that we are required to Φ. The disagreement 
between the unificationist and segregationist is about a kind of detachment.  Everyone 
agrees that if someone believes that they should Φ, nothing interesting follows about 
whether they really should. The interesting question is about the case in which they 
believe they should Φ and this belief is normatively appropriate. If this belief is 
sanctioned, could it then be wrong for the subject to Φ?  The unificationist thinks that it 
couldn't be wrong for the subject to Φ in line with her normative judgment.15  The 
segregationist thinks that it can be.  
 We can use the Enkratic Requirement to defend unificationism:  
Enkratic Requirement: You ought to see to it that: if you 
judge that you yourself ought to Φ, you Φ. 
The Enkratic Requirement is a wide-scope requirement, one that rules out certain 
combinations or patterns. The unificationist doesn't defend a wide-scope requirement 
that rules out combinations or patterns, but instead defends a conditional that says, in 
effect, that whenever you shouldn't Φ, you shouldn't judge or believe that you yourself 
should Φ. Some think that it is quite intuitive that we shouldn't be akratic, but how does 
this intuitive requirement about acceptable combinations give us a conditional that tells 
                                                        
14 The relevant requirements are those that have a special kind of rational authority such 
that we count as irrational or unreasonable if we give these requirements no weight. 
Requirements of the law or etiquette   
15 For defenses of unificationism, see Foley (2001), Gibbons (2010), Littlejohn (2012), 
and Way and Whiting (forthcoming). Greco (2014), Ichikawa and Jenkins (2013), 
Kiesewetter (forthcoming), Titelbaum (2015), and Smithies (2011) defend limited 
versions of unificationism that apply just in the epistemic realm.  For defenses of 
segregationism, see Coates (2012), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Feldman (2008), and 
Lasonen-Aarnio (MS). 
us that the justification of our attitudes about Φ-ing is linked to the justificatory status of 
Φ-ing?    
 Titelbaum (2015) shows us that there is a very simple argument from the 
Enkratic Requirement to unificationism.  Suppose that you ought not Φ. If so, could you 
nevertheless justifiably judge that you yourself ought to Φ? No, not if the Enkratic 
Requirement is a genuine requirement. We can rewrite the requirement as follows: you 
ought to see to it either (you do not believe that you ought to Φ or you Φ). Because we 
can assume that you ought not Φ, we can derive that you ought to see to it that you do 
not believe that you ought to Φ. Thus, if it is not the case that you ought not believe that 
you ought to Φ, it is not the case that you ought not Φ.  In the case where you justifiably 
judge that you ought to Φ, you couldn't be in a case where you ought to do other Φ.   
 Using the Enkratic Requirement, we can establish that false propositions about 
what you yourself are required to do are not things that you can justifiably believe. Let's 
consider two lessons we can take from this.  
 The first lesson is negative. It looks like we can argue from the impossibility of a 
certain kind of false, justified normative belief to the denial of these orthodox accounts 
of justification:  
Apparent Truth: If it seems to a subject that p and she has 
no available defeaters, her belief in p would be justified if 
based on this seeming.16 
Sufficient Strength: If a subject who doesn't believe p has 
sufficiently strong evidence for believing p, her belief in p 
would be justified if based on this evidence.17 
Mentalism: The justificatory status of a belief supervenes 
upon the subject's non-factive mental states and the 
subjective aspects of her mental events.18 
Reliabilism: If there is a sufficiently reliable process that 
produces the subject's belief in p, that belief is justified.19 
On these views, justification is not generally factive.  By focusing on propositions about 
what you yourself should do (where the thing done requires responding to things in 
your environment), we can generate counterexamples to these views.20  We can imagine 
pairs of subjects with the same evidence, with the same mental states, with the same 
equally reliable processes coming to believe that she is required to Φ where one gets it 
right and the other gets it wrong because she is prohibited from Φ-ing and thereby show 
that justification involves something that we don't get with sufficient strength, 
                                                        
16 This is an increasingly popular view. See, for example, Brogaard (2016), Huemer 
(2007), and Tucker (2010). 
17 See Conee and Feldman (2004). 
18 See Cohen (1984) and Conee and Feldman (2004). 
19 See Goldman (1986). 
20  Proponents of these views might say that their views are not subject to these 
counterexamples, but see the next section for a response to a line of response I think isn't 
very promising.  
something that doesn't supervene upon the mental, and something that the most reliable 
processes and methods will get wrong.21  
 The second lesson points us in a positive direction. We can now offer our first 
argument for Only Truth:  
A Transcendental Argument 
T1. There are objective practical norms that sometimes 
say that we should not Φ even when we're not aware that 
we should not Φ and not aware of the conditions that 
constitute the relevant norm's application conditions. 
T2. If there are such norms, there are situations where we 
should not judge that we are required to Φ even when we're 
not aware that we shouldn't Φ and are not aware of the 
conditions that constitute the relevant norm's application 
conditions.  
T3. The best explanation of this is that Only Truth 
governs belief.  
TC. So, Only Truth governs belief.  
This is an abductive argument, so much rests on (T3).  While (T1) and (T2) only rule 
out the possibility of a kind of false, justified belief (i.e., one that is about what we're 
required to do), there doesn't seem to be anything special about such beliefs from the 
epistemic point of view. It seems that only norms like Only Truth and Only Knowledge 
provide any explanation here as to why justification requires truth. So, using the 
Enkratic Requirement, we can show that objectivism about epistemic norms is required 
for objectivism about practical norms.   
   
2.2 Normative Beliefs and Normative Mistakes 
Let's consider two potential lines of objection. The first is concerned with the objectivist 
assumption about practical norms in the transcendental argument. The second is 
concerned with the assumption that we should invoke norms like Only Truth to explain 
why certain false, normative beliefs couldn't be justified. 
 Some readers would urge us to drop the assumption that there are objectivist 
practical norms. If we drop that assumption, we lose the argument sketched in the 
                                                        
21 It is worth noting that the argument for unificationism could go through even if we 
dropped our objectivist assumptions about practical norms. Even without these norms, 
we could cause trouble for these orthodox accounts of justification for it seems that each 
of these accounts should allow for the possibility of false but justified beliefs about what 
we ought to believe, feel, or do even if we assume that facts about these oughts 
supervene upon a subject's subjective mental life. Once we have established that there 
cannot be false, justified normative beliefs, it will then be difficult to resist an argument 
for Only Truth because we couldn't appeal to these (apparently) falsified accounts of 
justification to resist the arguments for Only Truth and (as we'll see below) because 
once we have the argument for the claim that normative beliefs have to be true to be 
justified we can then argue that the set of beliefs that would have to be true if justified 
includes non-normative beliefs.   
previous section. It's interesting that we don't save the orthodox views of justification 
that imply that there can be false, justified belief about what a subject is required to do. 
It still looks as if we might be able to run a revised abductive argument for Only Truth 
even if we drop (T1).  
 Using the Enkratic Requirement, we've established that when a subject is 
required not to Φ, this subject cannot justifiably judge that she's required to Φ.  This 
means that the subject cannot justifiably judge that she's required to required to Φ when 
it appears to her that she is so required, that she cannot justifiably judge that she's 
required to Φ when she has sufficiently strong evidence for this belief, and cannot 
justifiably judge that she's required to required to Φ when this belief is produced by a 
fallible but highly reliable process.   Because of this, the question still remains: if belief 
isn't governed by Only Truth, how could it be that it's impossible to justifiably judge 
that you should Φ in circumstances where you're required not to Φ? 
 To see that there's a lingering issue here, let's suppose we reject objectivism 
about practical requirements and adopt a view on which a subject is required to Φ when 
the expected value of Φ-ing is greater than that of any alternatives to Φ-ing. It isn't clear 
how this subjectivist view of practical requirements helps the proponents of the 
orthodox accounts of justification.  A subject who is ignorant about the relevant values 
or misled about the values could, it seems, come to well-founded or reliable but 
mistaken judgments about which option maximizes expected value.  She could 
presumably come to the judgment that she's required to Φ when in fact there's an 
alternative to Φ-ing that has greater expected value. Imagine pairs of thinkers with very 
similar beliefs but different evaluative evidence when it comes to the moral status of 
fetal harms. Because of this difference in evaluative evidence, we'd expect that there 
would be resultant differences in which well-founded beliefs they could have about the 
options that would or would not maximize expected value.  It isn't hard then to imagine 
situations where these thinkers are both required to refrain from Φ-ing but differ in that 
one has the well-founded belief that Φ-ing maximizes expected value when the other has 
the well-founded belief that it does not.  A unificationist might say about this case that 
the subject who has the mistaken but well-founded belief about which options maximize 
expected value couldn't have a justified belief about what maximized expected value if 
such a belief could be justified only if justifiably acted upon.22   
   In formulating the transcendental argument, I helped myself to objectivist 
assumptions about practical norms because I wanted to fill out the details of a 
philosophical view that I think is true. This assumption can be relaxed and we can still 
argue from the impossibility of a certain kind of false, justified normative belief to the 
denial of orthodox accounts of justification that allow for justified, false beliefs in cases 
where the beliefs are supported by good evidence or produced by a reliable process by 
focusing on cases of evaluative ignorance and mistake instead of factual ignorance and 
mistake. 
                                                        
22 There are interesting disagreements about whether evaluative ignorance, uncertainty, 
or mistake has any effect on what an agent should do. For arguments that it can, see 
Zimmerman (2008). For arguments that it cannot, see and Littlejohn (2014). 
 There is a second objection to the transcendental argument to consider. The 
unificationist view can be understood in two very different ways. If it's understood as a 
bottom-up view, the transcendental argument should go through. If, however, it is 
understood as a top-down view, the argument might seem less plausible. Remember that 
unificationism tells us that a specific kind of false belief cannot be justifiably held.   If 
you're in a case in which you shouldn't Φ, it couldn't be that your belief that you yourself 
should Φ is both justified and mistaken.  The disagreement between the bottom-up and 
top-down theorists is a disagreement about why this conditional is true.  If we 
understand this view as a bottom-up view, we would say that there are some facts about 
what a subject should or should not believe, feel, or do. They are independent targets 
that our beliefs are supposed to faithfully represent. They don't shift, sway, or move 
when we form beliefs about them, not even if the beliefs are reasonable, backed by good 
evidence, or produced by reliable processes.  Facts about what should or should not be 
done, felt, or believed are explanatorily prior to facts about what should or should not be 
believed, so these normative facts place normative constraints on our normative beliefs.   
 We could understand unificationism as a top-down view.23  On the top-down 
version of the view, we'd say that the reason that the belief that you ought to Φ could not 
be both justified and mistaken is that these normative facts are malleable or shifty. Part 
of what determines whether you should or shouldn't Φ are your normative beliefs and the 
things that figure in their justification. On the top-down view we would say that if the 
processes that produce our normative beliefs are reliable, the evidence that supports 
them is sufficiently strong, or they fit the appearances, they count as justified and then it 
couldn't be that you shouldn't Φ if you've judged that you should. 
 The abductive argument for Only Truth might appeal to bottom-up theorists but 
top-down theorists can object as follows. If, they might say, you had shown that 
normative beliefs couldn't be justified because they are false, that would provide support 
for Only Truth. The argument for unificationism, however, only establishes that there 
are some beliefs that cannot be justified and false. The top-down view gives us that, but 
it doesn't give us any reason to think that the relevant beliefs couldn't be justified by 
virtue of being false. Thus, there's no reason to think that we need to appeal to Only 
Truth to explain why normative beliefs are never justified if false.  
 This is a significant theoretical worry, but it shouldn't be difficult to put to rest. 
The top-down view faces serious problems that don't arise for the bottom-up view. We 
can see this if we think about inferences of this form:  
I must Φ. 
I cannot Φ unless Ι  Ψ.  
So, I must Ψ. 
And think about inferences of this form:  
I must give this to A. 
A is B. 
So, I must give this to B. 
                                                        
23 This seems to be the kind of view that Foley (2001) and Gibbons (2010) prefer. 
These inferences cause trouble for the top-down view. Let's suppose that the first 
premise in each inference is known and the second premise is false but (if this is 
possible) justifiably believed. Under these conditions, the conclusions should be 
justifiably believed if competently deduced. Depending upon how the details are filled 
in, we could have cases where the subject cannot both Φ and Ψ or cannot give the item to 
A and to B. Given the unificationist assumptions, we get the result that while the subject 
ought to do something (i.e., Φ or give something to A) they may do something that 
would prevent them from doing it (i.e., Ψ or give something to B).  Thus the top-down 
view loses the seemingly sensible principle that if you may do something, you can do it 
without thereby preventing yourself from fulfilling an obligation.24     
 There are further difficulties for the top-down approach that have to do with 
blame, responsibility, and fetishism. We would generally want to blame people for 
failing to do things that they know they ought to do and shouldn't blame people for 
actions that do not manifest de re unresponsiveness.25 It's difficult to see how the top-
down view could respect both of these constraints. The top-down explanation as to why 
there couldn't be false, justified normative beliefs doesn't appeal to Only Truth, but 
some mechanism by which facts about what a subject should do are 'shifted' to fit 
normative beliefs. Consider a case of shifting. If a subject fails to Φ when she fails to act 
on the justified belief that she must Φ in a shifting case (i.e., a case where the factors that 
explain the belief and account for its justification help to move the normative facts into 
                                                        
24 Way and Whiting (forthcoming) rightly note that previous arguments against the 
possibility of false, justified belief found in Littlejohn (2012) only support the thesis that 
if you justifiably judge that you ought to Φ that you may Φ and seek to defend something 
stronger using argument strategies that seem essentially the same. They try to show that 
if you justifiably judge that you ought to Φ then you ought to Φ. It isn't clear whether they 
prefer the top-down approach to the bottom-up approach. They also don't have any 
settled view about whether non-normative beliefs could be both justified and false. The 
worries about 'ought' and 'can' raise much more serious difficulties for their stronger 
principle if combined with the top-down approach. Facts about what an agent ought to 
do depend upon facts about what the agent has the opportunity and ability to do.  
Consider the first inference. We might imagine that in the actual world Agnes knows 
the premises and knowingly infers the conclusion. We then might imagine Agnes 
knowing the first premise, justifiably but falsely believing the second, and inferring the 
conclusion when the act isn't one that she can perform. The stronger principle that Way 
and Whiting endorse commits us to saying that Agnes ought to do what she cannot do. 
This problem doesn't arise on a view that incorporates Only Truth or on the bottom-up 
views, but unificationists who don't adopt these positions either have to deny that 
'ought' implies 'can' or adopt a highly skeptical view. See Littlejohn (2012) for 
discussion. Of course there are some authors who do not accept 'ought' implies 'can', but 
those who do not sometimes think that there are certain 'crazy actions' (e.g., those 
involving time-travel) that would be good that we cannot be obligated to do, so they 
might endorse something like 'ought' implies either 'can' or 'not a crazy action'. The 
weaker principle will steal wreak havoc.   
25 See Arpaly (2002) for discussion. 
position to make the belief true), the failure to Φ would not manifest de re 
unresponsiveness. 
 Finally, closure principles for justification cause difficulty for the top-down view.  
The top-down view is supposed to vindicate the idea that certain kinds of mistaken 
normative beliefs cannot be justified and false without appeal to Only Truth.  Consider, 
then, inferences of the following form:  
I ought to Φ 
If I ought to Φ, I can Φ.  
So, I can Φ.  
The top-down theorist wants to say that the first premise might be true in virtue of the 
subject's evidence, how things appear to the subject, or because the subject's beliefs are 
produced by reliable processes. Facts about what the subject can or cannot do are not 
among the sorts of things that constrain what evidence she has, how things appear, or 
whether her beliefs are produced by reliable processes, so difficulty will arise for the 
view when (a) the subject's strong epistemic position with respect to the normative 
proposition inclines us to accept that the subject justifiably believes the first premise and 
(b) the conclusion is false. If the conclusion is false but 'ought' implies 'can', it seems that 
the top-down theorist would have to say that in spite of the strong evidence, the 
appearances, the reliable processes, or whatever it is that she thinks would generally 
ensure that a belief is justified being in place, these things could not justify belief in the 
first premise if the conclusion of this inference is mistaken. 26  Thus, the top-down 
theorist would either have to say that nothing justifies belief in the first premise, nothing 
could justify belief in the first premise if the agent's ability to Φ depends upon how things 
are in the environment, or adopt a very bizarre objectivist view of the justification of 
normative beliefs according to which their truth isn't a constraint on whether they can 
be justifiably held but facts about what we can do are among the facts that constrain 
whether the belief can be justifiably held.   
 
2.3 Follow (Just) the Evidence 
In recent discussions of the nature of evidence and its theoretical roles, these principles 
concerning evidence and belief-revision enjoy widespread acceptance:  
Revise: If you have rational conditional beliefs and you 
acquire a new piece of evidence p then you ought to adjust 
your credence in q so that Pnewq = Pold(q|p).    
Remain: If you have rational conditional beliefs you 
should not update on p unless you acquire p as a new piece 
of evidence. 
                                                        
26 I appreciate that 'ought' implies 'can' is controversial. My impression is that its critics 
tend to agree that certain kinds of 'crazy' actions aren't actions that we ought to perform 
even if such actions would bring about great amounts of good (e.g., travelling through 
time, changing the past from the comfort of an armchair in the present). If 'ought' 
implies 'isn't a crazy action', we can get a version of this argument off the ground. 
Thanks to xyz for discussion.  
In combination, Revise and Remain tell us that we ought to update and revise our 
beliefs on the evidence and nothing but the evidence. 
 We can use these principles to generate an argument for objectivism about 
norms and justification.  To see how, consider two questions about evidence, a question 
about the role of justified belief in reasoning and a question about the ontology of 
evidence. Suppose that you come to justifiably believe p. You see that q would be true if 
p. What attitude should you take towards q? If we accept closure principles for 
justification, it would be proper or acceptable for you to believe q. That suggests that if 
you justifiably believe p and infer q, you wouldn't have violated Remain. That suggests, 
in turn, that whenever you justifiably believe p and see that q is true if p that there is 
something or other in your evidence that is the kind of thing you should serve as the 
basis for belief-revision and updates.  A natural explanation for this is the following:  
Justified Evidence: If you justifiably believe p, your 
evidence includes p.27 
 Now let's think about the ontology of evidence. We're interested in 
propositionally specified evidence or reasons, the things that are (potentially) the 
subject's reasons for believing, feeling, or doing things.  The subject's reasons are the 
things that figure in her reasoning and stand in logical relations. Ascriptions that specify 
the agent's propositionally specified reasons all entail corresponding propositional 
knowledge claims.28 If we say, 'Agnes' reason for -ing is that p', what we say is true 
only if, 'Agnes knows that p' is true. Thus, we have some linguistic evidence for half of 
Williamson's equation: 
E=K: Your evidence includes p iff you know p.29 
The argument I shall offer only requires that all propositional evidence is an object of 
propositional knowledge, but we get a quick argument for identifying all objects of 
propositional knowledge with evidence if we accept Justified Evidence and take 
knowledge to be sufficient for justified belief:  
An Evidentialist Argument for Objectivism 
E1. If you justifiably believe p, p is part of your evidence. 
E2. If p is part of your evidence, you know p.  
EC. If you justifiably believe p, you know p. 
This gives us the result we want. A belief is justified only if it is knowledge. Thus, there 
is a norm that requires us to believe only what we know, Only Knowledge. If we violate 
it, our beliefs aren't justified. 
 Like unificationism, Justified Evidence can be understood in different ways. On 
one way of interpreting it we're supposed to start with some independent notion of what 
justification is, think about whether beliefs that have the justification property can 
                                                        
27 For defenses of Justified Evidence, see Comesana (2016), Fantl and McGrath (2009), 
and Littlejohn (2012). 
28 See Hyman (1999), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2000). 
29 For defenses of E=K, see Williamson (2000). Hyman (1999) defends a similar view 
about potential motivating reasons. For criticism that doesn't focus on the truth-
requirement on reasons or evidence, see Hughes (2014) and Locke (2015). 
properly figure in practical reasoning, and conclude that because they can it must be 
that they contribute evidence to that reasoning. On another reading, the reading that I 
prefer, the idea isn't that a proposition gets turned into evidence by virtue of being the 
content of a belief that is well-supported or produced by a good process. Instead, the 
idea is that the justification of a belief turns on whether its contribution to rational 
processes (e.g., theoretical reasoning or practical reasoning) is a good one. If not, the 
belief doesn't meet the crucial standard that we use to assess beliefs. The proper order of 
explanation is like this. If a belief cannot supply what it should to the rational processes 
that involve it (i.e., a potential motivating reason), it couldn't be justified because it 
couldn't meet the crucial standard. If, however, your belief in p can provide what it's 
supposed to and put the thinker in a position to Φ for the reason that p, it meets the 
standard that we use to assess belief and couldn't fail to be justified.   
  These different readings of Justified Evidence point to very different 
explanations as to why something counts as evidence. On the first, there's something 
that counts as evidence or a potential motivating reason because the subject has some 
assets that make a belief that has the proposition as its content justified and thereby turns 
the belief's object into a piece of evidence or potential motivating reason. On the 
second, Justified Evidence is true not because we have assets that help turn propositions 
into evidence by virtue of making our attitudes towards them good in some way. 
Justified Evidence is true because of the liability we take on whenever we take on the 
commitment that is distinctive of belief. If a belief cannot deliver what it's supposed to 
(i.e., a potential motivating reason), it couldn't possibly have some other features that 
make it appropriate to take on.  I think that the second reading is preferable because it 
supports a view on which facts about the kinds of things that can be reasons or evidence 
place constraints on the kinds of beliefs that can be justified.30  
 However we understand Justified Evidence, we can use norms like Remain to 
get an argument for (O1) and (O2). If a putatively justified belief didn't provide us with 
evidence, it cannot properly figure in theoretical reasoning because it would violate 
Remain. If you violate Remain, however, it's hard to see how the belief could be 
justified. It's a belief that you shouldn't have.  You only conform to Remain if p is part of 
your evidence. So, your belief in p is justified only if p is part of your evidence. If E=K is 
true and p is part of your evidence, you know p. Thus, we get our argument for 
objectivism about norms and justification.  
 To resist this argument the subjectivists about justification must challenge 
Justified Evidence or E=K.  Dialectically, it doesn't make much sense for them to 
challenge Justified Evidence. The subjectivist about norms would not want to say that 
satisfying the norms that tell us when it's appropriate to update on a piece of evidence 
require more than justified belief. If they did, there would be pairs of cases where a 
subject justifiably believes a proposition in both but would only be permitted to update 
on that proposition in one. The requirement to refrain from updating in the one case 
would have to be sufficiently obscure to the subject so that they didn't threaten the 
                                                        
30 When we try to run things the other direction, we'll run into difficulties that we'll 
discuss below.   
justificatory status of her beliefs but nevertheless sufficiently 'internal' to be binding so 
that the subject shouldn't draw the conclusions she knows would have to be true given 
the things that she justifiably believed. It's hard to see how this view could possibly be 
attractive. 
 The subjectivist will say that internal duplicates will do equally well conforming 
to norms like Revise and Remain. They wouldn't want to say, then, that owing to 
differences in their knowledge about the external world it is possible for pairs of 
internally indiscernible subjects to draw the same inferences and reason in just the same 
ways to differ in that only one of them satisfies Remain. It wouldn't be wise for the 
subjectivist to insist that all of our evidence consists of propositions about our subjective 
mental life. If they did this and didn't also challenge E=K, their view would lead to an 
unpalatable form of skepticism. They shouldn't deny that whatever we know belongs to 
our evidence. If they challenged this, they'd have a hard time accommodating Justified 
Evidence. Their best strategy would be to challenge the idea that propositional 
knowledge is required for propositional evidence.  Specifically, their best strategy is to 
challenge the idea that all propositional evidence consists of facts or true propositions.  
 This is precisely what some of Williamson's critics have done. Comesana thinks 
that views that incorporate Justified Evidence and E=K run into trouble in cases of 
ampliative inference because this view rules out the possibility of false evidence: 
According to Williamson, a subject is justified in believing 
a proposition only if she knows it. Suppose now that a 
subject knows a proposition p because she infers it from 
another proposition q (which doesn’t entail p). In that case, 
according to Williamson the subject’s total evidence 
entails p, for the simple reason that it includes p. But let us 
suppose that the evidence on the basis of which she 
believes p (namely, q) does not entail p: the inference from 
q to p is ampliative. In that case, it is possible for another 
subject to also know q and to similarly come to believe p 
on its basis even when p is false. This subject, of course, 
does not know that p, for the simple reason that p is false in 
her situation. And yet her evidence for believing that p is 
exactly the same as the evidence that the first subject, who 
knows that p, has [or had prior to learning p]. Williamson’s 
position has the unfortunate consequence that the first 
subject is justified in believing that p whereas the second is 
not (Comesana 2015: 86). 
Is this consequence unfortunate? It doesn't seem so to me. To show that it's unfortunate, 
it would be helpful to have some rationale for thinking that the inferences yield beliefs 
with the same justificatory status and/or the same evidence.  It isn't clear why we 
should accept this crucial claim about the justificatory status of the inferential beliefs. 
An objectivist like Williamson can insist that the beliefs in the bad case aren't justified 
either because they violate Only Knowledge or because that's jut an implication of 
Justified Evidence and an independently motivated account of what our evidence 
consists of.   
 It might seem that Williamson is on weak ground because this response would 
force him to say that there can be justificatory differences without some difference in 
the reasons that bear on whether to hold the relevant beliefs. Before the subject draws 
the relevant inferences, the subject's evidence for p could have been the same, so 
shouldn't they be in the same position to justifiably draw the same inferences? To this, 
Williamson has an answer. It's important to distinguish cases where subjects have the 
same available evidence for an inferential belief and cases where the same reasons bear 
on whether to draw the relevant inference. On Williamson's view, there is a difference 
in the reasons that bear on whether to believe p.  In the bad case, the subject would 
violate Only Knowledge. Only Knowledge tells us that a subject in such a case shouldn't 
believe p. Because 'should' and 'ought' imply 'reason', Only Knowledge tells us that 
there's a reason for the subject in the bad case to refrain from believing p. There is no 
such reason in the good case because that is a case where the subject wouldn't violate 
Only Knowledge by coming to believe p.  In light of this difference, the difference in 
justificatory standing is just what we'd expect.31   
 Instead of focusing directly on the justificatory status of the inferential beliefs 
produced in the good and bad cases, Comesana could try to bracket the question about 
justificatory status and focus just on the question about whether the same inferences 
would provide the subject with the same evidence. It's going to be difficult to establish 
that the thinkers acquire the same evidence in these cases. One way to test proposals 
about when subjects possess reasons is to think about cases where the relevant 
propositions figure in reasoning. Suppose Agnes comes to believe p via ampliative 
inference but forgets her original grounds. She retains her belief in p and sees that r is 
true if p is. She infers r.  
 If p were among Agnes' reasons in the good and bad case, we'd expect that this 
reason could be her reason for thinking, feeling, and doing things. Consider three 
possible views about Agnes' evidence or reasons:  
Same: In the bad case, Agnes' reason for believing r is that 
p. It is the same reason as in the bad case. 
Different: In the bad case, Agnes' reason for believing r is 
not that p. There was something that was Agnes' reason, 
but it isn't that p.32 
Neither: There was nothing that was Agnes' reason for 
believing r in the bad case. There are reasons why Agnes 
                                                        
31 Some people find it intuitive that the beliefs produced in the right error cases are 
justified. This intuition has been addressed elsewhere. See Williamson (forthcoming). If 
that intuition carries the day, further arguments like the one we're considering aren't 
needed. If, however, that intuition doesn't undermine the view that justification requires 
knowledge, the present argument doesn't seem to create any serious difficulties for 
Williamson's views about evidence, justification, and knowledge. 
32 See Dutant (forthcoming), Hornsby (2007), and Lord (forthcoming). 
believed what she did, but these reasons weren't Agnes' 
reasons.33 
If someone is going to argue that the relevant falsehood (i.e., p) has to be part of Agnes' 
evidence in the bad case, it would be helpful to show that Same does better than 
Different and Neither in identifying Agnes' reasons in these cases.  Unfortunately, Same 
hasn't been carefully defended in the literature and all the linguistic evidence suggests 
that Different and Neither better account for the apparent entailments between 
ascriptions of reasons and knowledge. 34   Since someone who accepts Different or 
Neither wouldn't have any good reason to think that Agnes' evidence would have to 
include the falsehood, I don't yet see why we should part company with Williamson in 
insisting that the relevant falsehood that Agnes comes to believe via ampliative inference 
never constitutes a piece of evidence. 
 There is a further difficulty that arises for the kind of view that Comesana has 
proposed. On this view (the 'target view'), evidence or potential motivating reasons (i.e., 
the things that could be the subject's reason for thinking, feeling, or doing something) 
are propositions that can be true or false that get to be part of the subject's evidence by 
virtue of standing in some epistemically significant relation that we can bear to truths 
and falsehoods.  Justification or justified belief, as ordinarily understood, is supposed to 
play the role of the relevant possession condition. Difficulties arise for the target view 
when we think about the properties of processes like conditionalization and the 
properties of 'ought'. 
 Let's suppose, in keeping with the target view's understanding of Justified 
Evidence, that a proposition will belong to Agnes' evidence if rationally or justifiably 
believed and that this means that falsehoods will sometimes constitute part of Agnes' 
evidence (e.g., when they appear to be true, when they are backed by strong evidence, 
or when they are the content of a belief produced by a fallible but sufficiently reliable 
process). Imagine that Agnes completes Here I Am, a carefully researched if somewhat 
self-indulgent autobiography. Because it is so carefully researched, Agnes has a well-
founded belief that corresponds to each claim in the body of the book.  Thus, it would 
seem that she should have a justified belief that corresponds to each claim in the body of 
the book. After completing the body, her fact-checker tells her that she found precisely 
one error in the manuscript. Alas, her fact-checker dies suddenly and unexpectedly 
before she can reveal the error's location. After searching in vain for the error, Agnes 
fails to find the error. She notes in the book's preface that the book contains an error and 
it is sent to press.   
 As I understand the story, Agnes satisfies the conditions that orthodox accounts 
of justification impose, so we should say that she has a justified belief that corresponds to 
each claim in the body of her book (i.e., p1-p1,000,000) and in the preface. It would seem 
that the target view would allow that (P1)-(P3) could all be true:  
                                                        
33 See Alvarez (2010). 
34 For discussion of the linguistic evidence, see Hawthorne and Magidor (forthcoming), 
Littlejohn (2012), and Unger (1975). For defenses of a truth-requirement on evidence 
or reasons, see Alvarez (2010), Mantel (2013), and Mitova (forthcoming).  
P1. Agnes justifiably believes p1, Agnes justifiably believes 
p2, ..., and Agnes rationally believes p1,000,000. 
P2. Agnes justifiably believes ~(p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
P3. Whatever Agnes justifiably believes belongs to her 
evidence. 
P4. Agnes ought to update on p1, Agnes ought to update 
on p2, ..., and Agnes ought to update on p1,000,000. [(P1), 
(P3), and Revise] 
P5. Agnes ought to update on ~(p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
[(P2), (P3), and Revise] 
P6. Agnes ought to (update on p1 & update on p2 & ... & 
update on p1,000,000). [(P4), Agglomeration] 
P7. If Agnes ought to update on ~(p1 & p2 & ... & 
p1,000,000), Agnes ought not update on (p1 & p2 & ... & 
p1,000,000). 
P8. Agnes ought not update on (p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
[(P5), (P7)]  
P9. If Agnes ought to: (update on p1, update on p2, ..., 
update on p1,000,000), it is not the case that Agnes ought not 
update on (p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
P10. It is not the case that Agnes ought not update on (p1 
& p2 & ... & p1,000,000). [(P6), (P9)] 
Because (P10) contradicts (P8), it seems that we either have to abandon the target view 
or reject some other premise in the reasoning that leads to this contradiction. 
 If you accept the kind of objectivist view that I've defended (i.e., that 
incorporates Justified Evidence and E=K), you know that it couldn't be that (P1) and 
(P2) are correct, but I don't see how a proponent of the target view could plausibly 
reject both claims. 35 Justified Evidence is part of the target view, so its defenders cannot 
reject (P3). Revise generates a number of 'ought' claims about updating and they 
support (P6) because of agglomeration. As for (P7), this is the plausible claim that if you 
ought to update on p, you should not (also) update on its negation.  As for (P9), this is 
plausible given that a process like conditionalization is cumulative. The result of 
conditionalizing on the conjuncts is the same as the result of conditionalizing on the 
conjunctions. It is hard to see how there could be a requirement to update on p, say, a 
requirement to update on q, and also a requirement to refrain from updating on the 
                                                        
35 Some writers would argue that we shouldn't accept (P1) and (P2). Some would argue 
this because they think that there's some kind of defeater operative that prevents them 
from both being true (e.g., Ryan (1991)). For arguments that we shouldn't deny that it's 
possible for (P1) and (P2) to be true, see Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) and Worsnip 
(2015). Some would try to show that we don't have the right evidence or grounds for 
(P2) to be true (e.g., Smith (2016)).  Using testimony, it's hard to see how denying (P2) 
could be a viable strategy.    
conjunction when we know in advance that the result of the one-step update and two-
step update has to be the same.   
 The trouble with the target view is that when it drops the truth-requirement on 
evidence, it does so because it offers some non-factive epistemic relation to propositions 
as sufficient for the possession of evidence. This, in turn, prevents the proponents of the 
target view from allowing for inconsistent bodies of evidence.  Once we have that, we 
should not then let the evidence possessed determine what we 'ought' or 'ought not' do. 
If we did that, we couldn't vindicate the agglomeration of 'ought'.  If evidence is the 
kind of thing that we ought to be guided by and ought to compel us to update, it would 
have to consist of consistent sets of propositions. The best way to achieve that, 
theoretically, is to adopt a factive account of evidence.  Once we have that, Justified 
Evidence vindicates the objectivist account of justification and norms defended here.  
The reason that justified beliefs have to be true, remember, is not that they need some 
maximal independent support, but because only beliefs that contribute truths to rational 
processes meet the standard that distinguishes the beliefs that can do what they're 
supposed to do from those that cannot.  
 
3. Subjectivism about Justification 
Recall the argument for objectivism about justification:  
An Argument for Objectivism 
O1. Your beliefs are justified iff you violate no epistemic 
norms in holding these beliefs. 
O2. You violate no epistemic norms in holding these 
beliefs iff these beliefs constitute knowledge.  
OC. Your beliefs are justified iff they constitute 
knowledge. 
In the previous sections, I've offered a transcendental argument that Only Truth governs 
belief and an evidentialist argument that Only Knowledge governs belief. The 
transcendental argument, if sound, shows that the standard objections to (O2) miss their 
mark. The evidentialist argument, if sound, shows that you cannot believe what you 
should unless you believe only what you know to be true.  The upshot is that the false, 
justified belief is a myth. 
   Most epistemologists reject (OC), but it isn't always clear where they think my 
argument for objectivism goes wrong.  Huemer (forthcoming) suggests that the problem 
with arguments like my argument for (OC) is not so much that they assume that there 
are objectivist norms, but with the further assumption that these norms might tell us 
something about justification.  He agrees that there's a sense in which we 'ought' to 
conform to epistemic norms like Only Truth and could not justifiably believe what we 
'ought' not believe, but he thinks that this lends no support to objectivism about 
justification. 
 Huemer thinks that some of our normative vocabulary is ambiguous. Terms like 
'ought', 'should', and 'norm' can be read objectively (so that external facts that the 
subject might be ignorant of can matter to the truth of claims about what a subject 
'ought' to do, think, or feel) and also can be read subjectively (so that they do not matter 
to the truth of claims about what a subject 'ought' to do, think, or feel). When it comes 
to justification, justification is entirely a matter of conforming to subjective norms.     
 What should we take from this? When it comes to debates between the 
objectivist and subjectivist about norms, he thinks we should see that these debates 
aren't substantive:  
Now suppose someone asks, “Does what a person should do 
depend upon external facts of which that person may be 
unaware, or does it only depend upon information 
available from the subject’s own point of view?” This 
would be a misguided question. There is no deep issue 
there; there is only the perfectly shallow, semantic 
question of whether you want to use the internal sense or 
the external sense of the word “should”. Both senses, as far 
as I can tell, are established in ordinary English; neither is 
more correct than the other (Huemer: forthcoming: 7). 
Because these debates rest on the mistaken presupposition that there is a substantive 
debate to be had, they should end. The objectivist and subjectivist about norms should 
see that their opponent's views get something important right. Live and let live.   
 When it comes to debates about justification, however, things are quite different. 
He thinks these debates shouldn't continue because (P3) is true only on its subjective 
reading:  
The truth of this thesis [i.e., that justification is entirely a 
matter of conforming to subjective norms], by the way, 
strikes me as just an obvious semantic point. Unlike the 
word “should”, I think the word “justified” is not 
ambiguous; rather, it has only the internal meaning in 
standard English (Huemer forthcoming: 8).  
Even if the objectivist is right about epistemic norms, there is nothing that the 
objectivist about justification gets right.  When it comes to justification, it only matters 
whether we conform to subjectivist norms. Only the subjectivist about justification has a 
sensible view and that's why this debate should end. Live and let die.  
 In discussions of the subjective 'ought' and the (alleged) ambiguity of our 
normative language, philosophers tend to exhibit one of two tendencies. They tend to 
either be dividers or debaters.36 The divider thinks that pointing to the ambiguity will 
help us see that there is no need to debate a certain issue because both parties to the 
debate are right about something. The parties to the debate are only mistaken in that 
they fail to see their opponent's insights. The debater thinks that introducing the 
subjective 'ought' helps us see that the objectivist is wrong about some normative notion 
or notions.  As I mentioned earlier, it's long seemed strange to me that so many 
epistemologists would agree that there are norms like Only Truth or Only Knowledge 
that governs belief when these same epistemologists would insist that false beliefs can be 
perfectly justified. Maybe Huemer has his finger on something important here. Should 
we be dividers about norms and debaters about justification? Specifically, should we 
                                                        
36 See Sepielli (forthcoming). 
adopt his subjectivism about justification and accept that debates between objectivists 
and subjectivists about norms are non-substantive?  
 I think not. We've seen above why Huemer is so confident that the subjectivists 
are right about justification. I don't here want to survey the possible arguments for 
subjectivism about justification because most have already been addressed in the 
literature and I've gestured at some reasons why I don't think that Huemer's most recent 
argument will advance the subjectivist cause. Instead, I'd like to focus on the proposal 
that we should see these debates between the objectivist and subjectivist about norms as 
non-substantive. When we see why there is room for substantive disagreement here, we 
should also see why it isn't obvious that the subjectivist is right about justification. 
When these norms come into conflict, there is a substantive question about which 
norms to follow, a question that is clearly about whether we could act or believe with 
justification if we conformed to one set of norms while violating another. 
 If the dividers can show that debates between objectivists and subjectivists about 
the formulation of norms is misguided or not substantive, this would be because the 
subjectivist can vindicate everything the objectivist says so that there is no remaining 
substantive disagreement.  Can it be done? I have my doubts.  Subjective and objective 
norms can come into conflict in such a way that it looks as if subjectivists will simply 
have to deny that objectivist norms are genuine.  
 Consider the kind of disagreement that the divider would take to be non-
substantive. One such disagreement would be about the objectivist view of punishment 
(e.g., a view that incorporates Only the Guilty and Any Known Offender) and one that 
replaces these norms with some subjectivist alternative:  
You should sentence the accused iff their guilt is beyond 
all reasonable doubt (Beyond Reasonable Doubt). 
According to Only the Guilty and All Known Offenders, Agnes would have done 
nothing wrong if, say, she sentenced 1,000,000 persons standing trial provided that she 
knew of the accused to be guilty. Assuming, as we will, that Agnes believed the accused 
to be guilty beyond any reasonable doubt if she knew them to be guilty, the subjectivists 
who accept Beyond Reasonable Doubt would agree that Agnes did no wrong by 
sentencing these 1,000,000 persons for the crimes they committed.  
 The interesting issues don't arise when everyone agrees that Agnes got it all 
right. They arise in the cases where it seems to someone that Agnes got something 
wrong.  Let's imagine again that Agnes serves on 1,000,000 juries and that the evidence 
in each case leaves no room for reasonable doubt. Thus, we get:  
1. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 1. 
2. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 2. 
3. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 3.   
... 
1,000,000. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 1,000,000. 
Suppose that after her 1,000,000th case is brought to a close Agnes learns that in one of 
her cases the accused was framed. She thus learns:  
1,000,001. Agnes objectively ought not: (convict in case 
1, convict in case 2, ... convict in case 1,000,000).  
If Agnes knows that she objectively ought not do something, it seems plausible that she 
subjectively ought not do that thing:  
1,000,002. Agnes subjectively ought not: (convict in case 
1, convict in case 2, ... convict in case 1,000,000). 
If the subjective 'ought' acts anything like the 'ought' of standard deontic logic, we can 
use agglomeration and (1)-(1,000,000) to give us this: 
1,000,003. Agnes subjectively ought to: (convict in case 1, 
convict in case 2, ... convict in case 1,000,000).  
And if the subjective 'ought' acts anything like the 'ought' of standard deontic logic 
(1,000,002) gives us:  
1,000,004. It is not the case that Agnes subjectively ought 
to: (convict in case 1, convict in case 2, ... convict in case 
1,000,000).  
 Since (1,000,003) and (1,000,004) are incompatible, something has to give. It 
seems we have four options:  
Option 1: Deny at least one of (1)-(1,000,000) and deny 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt. 
Option 2: Deny (1,000,001) and deny Only the Guilty.  
Option 3: Deny that the subjective 'ought' acts anything 
like the 'ought' of standard deontic logic.  
Option 4: Deny the bridge principle that states that you 
subjectively should not do what you know you objectively 
should not do. 
Dividers want to show that the disagreement between the subjectivists and objectivists 
isn't substantive, so they cannot avoid the contradiction by means of Option 1 or 2. If 
they deny Only the Guilty or Reasonable Doubt because of some (apparent) tension 
between them, they would enter into just the debate that they wish we'd all stay out of.  
 The third option is problematic for dividers.  Suppose we've established (1)-
(1,000,000) and (1,000,002) and look to avoid the contradiction by denying 
agglomeration. It seems that, barring cases of duress, a subject who fails to do what she 
subjectively ought to could be held responsible for that failure or subject to criticism. 
We shouldn't blame or criticize someone for carrying out all of the acts described in (1)-
(1,000,000) if we'd blame or criticize them for failing to carry them all out. (Does it 
make sense to say that someone would avoid criticism iff they sentenced in each case 
but would not avoid criticism if they sentenced everyone?) 
 The fourth option is the last option for the dividers. It looks as if they have good 
grounds for challenging the bridge principle.37   Consider the mineshaft case.38  Ten 
miners are working together underground, but Agnes doesn't know whether they are in 
Shaft A or Shaft B. She knows that it's raining and that if she does nothing all will die at 
the bottom of the mine. She has three options: block shaft A, block shaft B, partially 
                                                        
37 See Wedgwood (2013) for discussion. Wedgwood offers a revision of the Enkratic 
Requirement that is supposed to avoid the difficulties that arise for this bridge principle. 
The principle holds only when Φ is a fine-grained option. In our case, it is not. 
38 Discussed in Parfit (2011). The case is a variant on Regan (1980) and Jackson (1991).  
block both shafts.  If she completely blocks the opening to A, there will be enough air 
inside for 10 to live but B will flood and kill anyone in that shaft. If she blocks B 
completely, there will be enough air inside for 10 to live, but A will flood and kill 
anyone in that shaft. If she partially blocks both openings, she will be guaranteed to save 
9 miners wherever they happen to be but 1 will be killed. In this sort of case, Agnes 
knows that she objectively ought to either block Shaft A or B, but doesn't know which 
shaft it is. Thus, she knows that she objectively ought not partially close the shafts. Still, 
it seems to many commentators that Agnes subjectively ought to partially close the 
shafts. This suggests that the bridge principle is mistaken. 
 Wedgwood notes (rightly, I think) that the Enkratic Requirement is a genuine 
requirement only when the subject's beliefs pertain to fine-grained options (e.g., 
blocking shaft A completely). Thus, it's plausible that the bridge principle is only 
superficially similar to the Enkratic Requirement and shouldn't be accepted without 
some very compelling further argument.  If dividers reject the bridge principle, are they 
out of the woods? 
 No, not quite. If they deny the bridge principle, this allows them to reject 
(1,000,002). They could say that while there is a sense in which Agnes succeeded in 
doing everything she should do, there is a second sense in which she failed to do what 
she should do. Suppose we say that. If Agnes then asked whether she should make 
reparations, what would the divider say? 
 The divider should ask the subjectivists what they'd say. The subjectivist might 
offer a version of Repair, suitably modified to fit with their theoretical orientation. They 
might say that upon discovering that she sentenced an innocent person to prison, Agnes 
has a reparative duty to right some past wrong. On this view, it turns out to be true, as 
the objectivist says, that Agnes failed to do what she ought to do, but crucially the truth 
of this depends upon the fact that this new information came to light. Alternatively, the 
subjectivist could insist that since Agnes did no wrong, violated no norm, and never 
failed to do what she ought to do. If so, no reparation is called for.  The subjectivist 
would say that the objective facts that figure in objectivist accounts of norm have to be 
excluded from the framework so that they don't figure in our account of rights, 
obligations, or duties to repair or make reparation.39 The accused would have the right 
to a fair trial, but not to escape sentencing if innocent. Those responsible for sentencing 
would have the responsibility to provide an adequate trial, but no responsibility to 
discharge reparative duties in response to harms that result from trials that were 
conducted as they should have been.  
 The problem with the first response is that it leads us right back to the problem 
we were trying to avoid by denying the bridge principle. If the subjectivist says that 
Agnes has a reparative duty because she failed to do something she ought to do by 
virtue of sentencing the accused in each case, the subjectivist is offering us an account 
                                                        
39 The most completely worked out version of this view is found in Zimmerman (2008). 
He is a subjectivist in the sense that he thinks that what a subject ought to do depends 
upon her evidence and not upon any further facts that don't supervene upon that 
evidence. He is not a divider. For further defenses of the subjectivist debater, see 
Kiesewetter (forthcoming) and Lord (forthcoming b).  
on which (1,000,004) comes out as true. As we're assuming that the subjectivist wants 
to offer an account of 'ought' on which 'ought' satisfies agglomeration, this proposal 
won't do.  The truth of (1,000,004) would force us to give up at least one of (1)-
(1,000,000) but the subjectivist has no good grounds for giving up any of these claims. 
The new information doesn't change the fact that Agnes had adequate evidence at the 
time of sentencing and doesn't change the fact that she still has adequate evidence for 
believing of each conviction that it was appropriate.  
 The second subjectivist response causes trouble for the divider. It looks as if the 
subjectivist who offers this response is now engaged in a genuine, substantive 
disagreement with the objectivist. Even if Agnes learned the identity of the individual 
who was framed, our subjectivist would insist that the objectivists would be wrong to 
say that Agnes did something that violated this person's rights, that she failed in her 
obligations to the accused, and wrong to say that Agnes has a reparative duty to right 
some past wrong. At just this point it looks like there is a substantive question that we 
need to settle.  Upon discovering the identity of the innocent person she convicted, 
would Agnes' decision not to make reparations be justified? If you say that it would, you 
are taking up a substantive view and siding with a kind of subjectivist debater. If you 
say that it would not, you are taking up a substantive view and siding with the 
objectivist who thinks that justification turns on conforming to objectivist norms. It 
seems pretty obvious to me that Agnes would have no justification for failing to try to 
make reparations, but this interesting fact about justification would appear to be 
connected to the past violation of an objectivist norm (Only the Guilty), not a 
subjectivist norm.  Thus, the debate turns out to be substantive and the objectivist view 
about justification turns out to have an important virtue that the subjectivist view lacks. 
The objectivist (and the objectivist alone?) has a coherent position that vindicates 
important intuitions about reparation.                     
 
4. Conclusion 
I have defended two objectivist views, one about norms and another about justification. 
There is no simple case to be made for either objectivist view, but it seems that the 
objectivist framework best fits with some plausible claims about the kinds of obligations 
we're under and with some popular claims about the normative significance of our 
evidence. What emerges from this is a simple idea that will undoubtedly require further 
defense. For belief to play its role well, it has to provide us with reasons and put us in 
touch with the part of reality that consists of facts. A belief only does this when it 
constitutes knowledge. This is why Only Knowledge governs belief. There is little 
theoretical gain to be had by insisting that this point, if correct, tells us nothing about 
justification. Justification loses all of its theoretical significance if we characterize it as a 
status that a belief can have or fail to have quite apart from whether that belief conforms 
to all the norms that govern belief. This is why objectivism about norms and justification 
stands or falls together. 
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